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THINKING RACE, MAKING NATION 
reviewing 
THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 
By Glenn C. Loury.  Harvard University Press, 2002.  
Christopher A. Bracey 
[T]he real inequality that is produced by fortune or by law is always  
succeeded by an imaginary inequality that is implanted in the manners of 
people. 
– Alexis de Tocqueville1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
We live in a race-conscious culture.  As Americans, we are a nation of 
people who self-consciously chose to adopt a vision of society that em-
braced lofty ideals of individual freedom and democracy along with power-
ful mechanisms for devastating racial oppression.2  Our history is replete 
 
  Associate Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law.  I thank my research assis-
tants Sarah Burnett and Lise Byars for their superb effort on this project.  Also, I want to extend a spe-
cial thank you to my colleagues Troy Paredes and F. Scott Kieff for multiple thoughtful discussions of 
the ideas and issues contained in this essay.  
1  ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 357 (Everyman’s Lib. ed. 1994) (1835). 
2  Western-style racism and race consciousness are truly distinctive when viewed against the back-
drop of the global history of racism precisely because each developed within an overarching cultural 
mindset premised upon human equality.  See GEORGE M. FREDERICKSON, RACISM:  A SHORT HISTORY 
12 (2002) (“It is uniquely in the West that we find the dialectical interaction between a premise of equal-
ity and an intense prejudice toward certain groups that would seem to be a precondition for the full 
flowering of racism as an ideology or worldview.”). 
The United States Constitution itself embodies a powerful contradiction—a guarantee of individual 
freedom for all, and an explicit endorsement of Negro slavery.  Compare U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the 
people of the United States, in order to . . . secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity 
do ordain and establish this Constitution . . . .”), with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (counting Negro 
slaves as three-fifths of one person for political representation purposes), and U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 
1 (allowing for the importation and federal taxing of slave labor until the 1808), and U.S. CONST. art. 
IV, § 2, cl. 3 (creating a constitutional right to the return of fugitive slaves), and U.S. CONST. art. V 
(prohibiting amendment of the slave importation and taxation provision of the Constitution prior to 
1808).  Although the words slave and slavery are studiously excluded from the Constitution, I think 
former president John Quincy Adams put it best when he remarked that “circumlocutions are the fig 
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with instances of differential treatment on account of race—slavery being 
only the most egregious example3—that achieved the desired effect of gen-
erating remarkable disparities in socioeconomic well-being among indi-
viduals and between different racial groups.4  Such disparities are not 
simply historical artifacts.  They are facts of the contemporary American 
racial landscape as well.5  Racial disparity in socioeconomic well-being has 
always been, and continues to be, a central feature of American life. 
This is not to suggest that race, as embedded in American cultural con-
sciousness, has a fixed meaning.  To the contrary, it is the fluidity of race—
the ability to transform from the biological to the ideological to the meta-
physical—that accounts for its longevity in our national character.  Confu-
sion (or perhaps lack of consensus) regarding the meaning and significance 
of racial difference, I believe, has led to a surprising lack of sensitivity on 
the part of the American public when it comes to racial disparities.  Evi-
dence of racial disparity in health, wealth, and society is rarely met with 
outrage.6  Yet each of us, through the day-to-day observations that comprise 
 
leaves under which these parts of the body politic are decently concealed.”  JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, 
ARGUMENT OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, IN THE 
CASE OF THE UNITED STATES, APPELLANTS, VS. CINQUE, AND OTHERS, AFRICANS, CAPTURED IN THE 
SCHOONER AMISTAD (1969). 
3  Other historic examples that further illustrate this contradiction include:  Federal Indian removal 
policy, see The Indian Removal Act of 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830), prohibitions on the naturaliza-
tion of non-whites, see Uniform Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (1790) (restricting natu-
ralization to “free White persons”), curtailment of rights of Asian immigrants, see Chinese Exclusion 
Act of 1882, ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115 (1882) (barring entry of Chinese laborers into the United States for 
ten years); Scott Act of 1888, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504 (1888) (prohibiting Chinese resident aliens who 
traveled between China and the United States from reentering the United States), and Japanese Ameri-
can internment during World War II, see generally ERIC YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND 
REPARATION:  LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT (2001).   
4  Human relations always take place against the backdrop of the relative power possessed by each 
person.  See MAX WEBER, BASIC CONCEPTS IN SOCIOLOGY 117 (H.P. Secher trans., 1962) (describing 
“power” in social settings as “that opportunity existing within a social relationship which permits one to 
carry out one’s will even against resistance and regardless of the basis on which this opportunity rests”).  
Slavery represents the ultimate expression of such power—absolute power for the master and absolute 
powerlessness for the slave–and a most obvious means of imposing social, economic, and cultural isola-
tion.  See ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH:  A COMPARATIVE STUDY 182, 183 
(1982).    
5  For a discussion of discrimination in retail purchases, see Ian Ayres, Further Evidence of Dis-
crimination in New Car Negotiations and Estimates of Its Cause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 109, 116 (1995) 
(finding that black males received final offers that were, on average, $1,132 higher than those offered to 
white males); Ian Ayres, Fair Driving:  Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 
104 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1991) (reporting similar results using a smaller sample of testers).  For a dis-
cussion of mortgage credit discrimination or “redlining,” see DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. 
DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:  SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 50–57, 105–
09 (1993); Keith N. Hylton & Vincent D. Rougeau, Lending Discrimination:  Economic Theory, 
Econometric Evidence, and the Community Reinvestment Act, 85 GEO. L.J. 237, 241 (1996) (citing 
GEORGE J. BENSTON ET AL., AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF MORTGAGE REDLINING 1–33 (1978) (summariz-
ing a number of empirical studies confirming the existence of redlining in various communities)). 
6  Perhaps one of the most disturbing areas in which we witness a conspicuous absence of outrage at 
97:911  (2003) Thinking Race, Making Nation 
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our life experience, comes to understand, to a greater or lesser extent, the 
vital importance of race in shaping our individual destinies.  Whether we 
experience racial inequality through the prism of privilege or poverty, it is 
difficult to ignore this crucial aspect of our existence.  
Of course, we each choose how we come to terms with racial inequal-
ity, how we rationalize, compartmentalize, or explain this phenomenon, and 
how we integrate our “raced” existence into our personal view of the world.  
For nearly three generations, we have undertaken a largely sustained collec-
tive effort to eliminate racial discrimination in American society.7  For 
some, the persistence of chronic racial inequality in the face of sustained ef-
forts to ameliorate racial discrimination confirms deeply held suspicions re-
garding the intellectual, cultural, or economic capacity of African 
Americans.8  For others, the persistence of racial disparity highlights the 
limits of the prevailing approach to antidiscrimination law9 and makes the 
 
racial disparity is in the context of the ever-increasing prison population in the United States.  Critics of 
such disparity, such as Marc Mauer and Michael Tonry, struggle to shake public indifference on this is-
sue.  See MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE (1999); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT:  RACE, 
CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995).  Indeed, Mauer wonders explicitly if society would ex-
press similar acceptance and complacency if most prisoners were white, instead of half the prison popu-
lation being black, and another seventeen percent Latino.  Mauer, supra, at 12, 118.   
7  See generally ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT:  BLACK 
COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE (1984).  For an account of litigation that secured civil rights 
reforms between 1936 and 1961, see MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW:  THURGOOD 
MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936–1961 (1994).  For an intriguing history of trials and tribu-
lations of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, see JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS:  HOW A 
DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1994).  For an account 
of the civil rights movement viewed through the narrative of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s life, see TAYLOR 
BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS:  AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1954–63, at 212 (1988).  For a general 
overview of events and litigation immediately following the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. 
Board of Education, see RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE:  THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 748–78 (1975).   
8  See, e.g., RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE:  INTELLIGENCE AND 
CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994) (purporting to document differences between races in 
measured intelligence and positing that such differences are genetic in origin); DINESH D’SOUZA, THE 
END OF RACISM:  PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY (1995) (arguing that African Americans, as 
a group, are culturally inferior to whites); JOHN MCWHORTER, LOSING THE RACE:  SELF-SABOTAGE IN 
BLACK AMERICA (2000) (arguing that deficiencies in African American socio-economic well-being are 
attributable to three self-imposed features of African American society:  a desire to play the perpetual 
role of society’s victim, a love for separatism, and a propensity to reward anti-intellectual achievement). 
9  The antidiscrimination principle animates our prevailing approach to eliminating racial discrimina-
tion in American society.  The antidiscrimination principle is premised on the basic idea that law should 
not classify or treat persons differently simply because those persons belong to a different race, and that 
we should be suspicious of any attempt to do so.  Much of modern civil rights law and doctrine is prem-
ised upon this basic notion.  See Paul Brest, Forward:  In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 
90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1 (1976) (noting that “Congress read the antidiscrimination principle into the thir-
teenth amendment; and the Supreme Court has construed the amorphous language of the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment to hold that racial classifications are ‘constitutionally suspect’ 
and subject to ‘the most rigid scrutiny’” and observing that “[t]he antidiscrimination principle lies at the 
core of most state and federal civil rights legislation, including the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968” (footnotes omitted)).  As a general matter, one 
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case for greater intervention.10   
Glenn C. Loury’s The Anatomy of Racial Inequality is a thoroughgoing 
attempt to ascertain the root causes of racial inequality and provide insight 
into the thought process that causes us to view racial disparity with compla-
cency and indifference.  However, Loury’s project is not merely descrip-
tive.  How we choose to comprehend racial inequality has tremendous 
normative implications for how we shape our national identity.  Thus, 
Loury’s structural account of racial inequality provides the staging ground 
 
must prove discriminatory intent in order to establish that violation of antidiscrmination law has oc-
curred.  See, e.g., Personnel Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278–80 (1979) (holding that incidental ef-
fect on a protected group is insufficient to demonstrate discriminatory purpose); Vill. of Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–68 (1977) (holding that proof of racially 
discriminatory intent is necessary to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause); Washington v. 
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248–52 (1976) (rejecting a disparate impact theory in an equal protection claim).  
For an interesting critique of this position, see Alan Freeman, Legitimating Racial Discrimination 
Through Antidiscrimination Law:  A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 
1049 (1978) (arguing that the intent-impact controversy is one element of a more general ideological 
struggle between “victim” and “perpetrator” perspectives within antidiscrimination law).  Similarly, the 
federal courts have construed the antidiscrimination principle as hostile toward affirmative action meas-
ures and other arguably benign racial classifications.  See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 
200 (1995) (declaring unconstitutional a federal program designed to enhance participation of minority-
owned construction firms in government contracting); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 798 (1st Cir. 
1998) (rejecting Boston Latin School’s affirmative action plan for only considering race and not other 
dimensions of diversity); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that admissions plan 
considering only blacks and Mexican-Americans, but not other racial groups or nonracial dimensions of 
diversity fails narrow tailoring); Johnson v. Regents of Univ. of Ga., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1369 (S.D. 
Ga. 2000) (same), aff’d, 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding that “diversity” in higher education 
cannot constitute a constitutionally compelling government interest); Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 
2d 821, 847 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (same). 
10  See Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:  Transformation and Legitimation 
in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1376–81 (1988) (arguing that antidiscrimination 
law has largely succeeded in eliminating symbolic manifestations of racial oppression but has allowed 
the perpetuation of material subordination of people of color); DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT 
SAVED:  THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 3 (1987) (“With the realization that the salvation of 
racial equality has eluded us again, questions arise from the ashes of our expectations:  How have we 
failed—and why?  What does this failure mean—for black people and for whites?  Where do we go 
from here?  Should we redirect the cause for racial justice?”); Linda S. Greene, Race in the 21st Cen-
tury:  Equality Through Law?, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1515, 1517 (1990) (“The civil rights decisions of the 
1989 Term force us to refocus on a question presented time and time again, before and after Dred Scott:  
whether meaningful equality can be obtained for African Americans through law.”). 
This line of argument also arises within the context of reparations for slavery.  The scholarly and 
popular literature on reparations has grown tremendously in the decades following the publication of 
Boris I. Bittker’s The Case for Black Reparations in 1973.  See, e.g., RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT:  
WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS (2000); JOE R. FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA:  ROOTS, CURRENT 
REALITIES, AND FUTURE REPARATIONS (2000); GEORGE SCHEDLER, RACIST SYMBOLS AND 
REPARATIONS:  PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON VESTIGES OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR (1998); 
DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 54–55 (3d ed. 1992); MARY FRANCES BERRY & 
JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, LONG MEMORY:  THE BLACK EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA 405–06 (1982); see 
also Robert Westley, Many Billions Gone:  Is It Time To Reconsider the Case for Black Reparations?, 
40 B.C. L. REV. 429 (1998); Vincene Verdun, If the Shoe Fits, Wear It:  An Analysis of Reparations to 
African Americans, 67 TUL. L. REV. 597 (1993).  
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from which he launches a deep critique of prevailing views on American 
race relations.  “The ‘conservative line’ on race in America today is sim-
plistic,” writes Loury.11  Racial inequity is not the product of some inherent 
deficiency in the minds and hearts of African Americans.  Rather, it is a so-
cial pathology “deeply rooted in American history”—a pathology that 
“evolved in tandem with American political and economic institutions, and 
with cultural practices that supported and legitimated those institutions . . . 
that were often deeply biased against blacks.”12  Loury rejects the compla-
cency evinced by this conservative policy of indifference toward racial dis-
parities, and declares emphatically that racial inequality is “an American 
tragedy [and] a national, not merely a communal disgrace.”13 
The Anatomy of Racial Inequality is Loury’s attempt to unveil the ar-
chitecture that sustains racial inequality in an effort to define a normative 
orientation for racial policy in the years to come.  His argument proceeds in 
four discrete phases.  First, Loury argues that race is a powerfully important 
social convention, though it has no real scientific basis.14  The social con-
vention of race, according to Loury, was historically critical to the dispensa-
tion of rewards and privileges in the United States. 
In the second phase of his argument, Loury attempts to explain the sa-
lience of race-based thinking in the minds of white Americans.  Loury 
maintains that the roots of race-based thinking lie in racial stereotypes.  
Whites assign qualities and characteristics to African Americans and then 
act in accordance with these stereotypes.  Because whites structure institu-
tions and arrangements in a manner that is consistent with and predictive of 
these stereotypes, Loury maintains that the stereotyped group often re-
sponds in ways that demonstrate or reflect these same qualities and charac-
teristics.  In other words, institutions and customs that are designed with 
stereotypes “in mind,” so to speak, often generate behavior and structural 
outcomes that are consistent with the stereotypes. 
This self-confirming “feedback loop” that sustains informal anti-black 
bias could be easily overcome, according to Loury, simply by viewing tar-
gets of informal discrimination as individuals of equal humanity and not as 
the walking embodiment of a collectively stereotyped racial identity.  But 
as Loury perceptively notes, “people do not freely give the presumption of 
equal humanity.”15  Thus, in the third phase of his argument, Loury seeks to 
explain why stereotypes that sustain racial inequality are so intractable.  The 
great barrier to the bestowal of equal humanity, says Loury, is the powerful 
role that racial stigma plays in shaping deeply held beliefs and attitudes.16 
 
11  GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 105 (2002).   
12  Id.   
13  Id.   
14  Id. at 20–23. 
15  Id. at 87.  
16  Id. at 88.   
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Racial stigma, according to Loury, is not so much about casual obser-
vations of blacks as it is about characteristics about the inherent nature of 
African Americans—about who, at the deepest level, they are understood to 
be.  American blacks, according to Loury, have suffered the most from 
stigmatization as a result of the historical taint of slavery.  Blacks, dishon-
ored as a race by slavery, possess what he calls a “spoiled identity.”17  It is 
the lingering effects of this spoiled identity that make it difficult for whites 
today to view blacks as individuals like themselves.  This spoiled identity, 
reinforced by social structures, explains why African Americans, despite 
advances, are still at the bottom on many social and economic indices, and 
why whites are largely indifferent to evidence of racial disparity. 
Each of the foregoing arguments leads Loury to the conclusion that 
traditional individual-based, process-oriented colorblind liberalism will not 
solve the problem.  Overt racial discrimination in formal social interac-
tions—such as discrimination in the job market—is no longer the chief ob-
stacle to overcoming racial inequality.  Rather, it is “discrimination in 
contact,” which Loury describes as informal and entirely legal patterns of 
socializing and networking that tend to exclude blacks, that most power-
fully reinforce racial inequality in the modern era.  Because the absence of 
overt discrimination creates the illusion of equality, Loury maintains that it 
is “rational” but incorrect for the informal discriminator to conclude that 
evidence of racial disparity is simply a reflection of the natural order of 
things.  Racial stigma and the practice of informal racial discrimination, 
then, and not overt racial discrimination, are the root causes of African 
American underdevelopment and the perpetuation of racial inequality. 
Hence, the challenge to racial inequality must focus on the eradication 
of racial stigma and the assertion and acknowledgment of the essential hu-
manity of blacks.  This task, according to Loury, cannot be undertaken with 
colorblind indifference.  To the contrary, Loury concludes that the promise 
of fairness, individual freedom, and dignity will remain unfulfilled without 
some form of intervention based upon race.  Public policy must promote 
substantive racial egalitarianism that is directed squarely at remedying ra-
cial disparities rather than procedural equality designed to address concrete 
instances of “provable” racial discrimination.   
Loury has presented a powerfully written and tightly argued book that 
could very well serve as an intelligent manifesto (although, given its pro-
nounced moralistic tone, I suspect Loury would be more comfortable with 
“sermon” as a descriptor) for future writings on the concept of racial ine-
quality.  It is an interdisciplinary text that is rich with transformative possi-
bilities.  Loury’s book walks a difficult line:  on one side is the hope and 
optimism of being able to make sense of things descriptively and norma-
tively.  On the other side is the critical impulse of nihilism—one that risks, 
but does not indulge, the impulse to collapse into despair and passivity, 
 
17  Id. at 65–69. 
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with a loss of faith in the human capacity to overcome the taint of racial 
stigma and racial disparities that ensue.   
In a very real sense, Loury’s free and extended meditation on racial 
inequality and the prospects of racial reform provides us with an insightful 
theoretical and discursive structure through which we can engage the strug-
gle for racial justice anew.  In Part II of this Review Essay, I examine and 
critique the major arguments presented in the book.  In Part III, I conclude 
by offering a few thoughts on what Loury’s analysis may mean for the fu-
ture of American race relations. 
II. THE LOURY THESIS OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 
A. Getting Sight of Racial Disparity 
A crucial first step in addressing the problem of racial inequality is to 
understand and appreciate the scope and magnitude of the problem.  For 
Loury, the problem is clear: 
Nearly a century and a half after the destruction of the institution of slavery, 
and a half-century past the dawn of the civil rights movement, social life in the 
United States continues to be characterized by significant racial stratifica-
tion. . . .  Indeed, over the past quarter century the disadvantages of 
blacks . . . [have] remained unchanged, or, in some instances, [have] even 
worsened.18 
In support of this proposition, Loury has collected data on various indicia of 
socioeconomic well-being—including wages, unemployment rates, wealth 
levels, standardized test scores, incarceration rates, and mortality statis-
tics—that “reveal substantial racial disparities.”19 
Interestingly, these data are neither presented nor discussed at length in 
the text.  Instead, the data are consigned to an extended appendix and pre-
sented in crude tabular form.  This style of presentation immediately trig-
gers two thoughts in the mind of the skeptical reader.  First, how much 
racial disparity is really out there?  Second, is the evidence of disparity suf-
ficient to warrant an extended meditation on its cause?  Loury asserts that 
“we have a problem; it will be with us for a while; and it behooves us to 
think hard about what can and should be done.”20  But given the minimal 
discussion of the nature and extent of racial inequality provided thus far, 
what are we to make of this loose, moralistic claim?  What reason do we 
have to shake off the complacency and indifference that Loury says have 
characterized our response in the past? 
Fortunately for Loury, these data provide strong support for his other-
wise gauzy proposition.  African Americans with the same level of educa-
 
18  Id. at 3–4.  
19  Id. at 4.   
20  Id.  
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 918 
tion as whites continue to earn substantially less.21  Blacks continue to oc-
cupy proportionally fewer managerial positions and proportionally greater 
service and unskilled labor positions.22  Median family income for African 
Americans is roughly two-thirds that of whites.23  Black youth continue to 
lag behind whites in performance on standardized tests for mathematics and 
reading comprehension.24  The percentage of African-American children 
under the age of eighteen who live in poverty is almost double that of 
whites.25  The same is true for the number of births to unwed mothers.26  
Homicide victimization rates for blacks are nearly double the rates for 
whites.27  Incarceration rates for black men are seven times those of white 
men.28  African-American adult men and women have a shorter life expec-
tancy than their white counterparts,29 with black infant mortality rates ap-
proximately double those for whites.30 
Each of us is perhaps familiar with one or two of these points of com-
parison, and it is easy to remain relatively unfazed by evidence of disparity 
in an isolated aspect of social life.  Yet it is more difficult to remain un-
moved when confronted by the totality of racial disparity presented here.  
The collected data create a mosaic image of a racial caste, and as such de-
mand our full attention.  It immediately calls into question banalities such 
as “the civil rights era ended racial discrimination” or “we live in a color-
blind society.”  More importantly, it gives force to the claim advanced by 
Loury and others that nearly every aspect of our lives is mediated by race.31 
 
21  Id. at 175. 
22  Id. at 176. 
23  Id. at 184. 
24  Id. at 180–81.   
25  Id. at 190.   
26  Id. at 196.  
27  Id. at 200.  
28  Id. at 201. 
29  Id. at 182. 
30  Id. at 204. 
31  See Ian Haney López, The Social Construction of Race:  Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrica-
tion, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3 (1994).  López observes:  
Human fate still rides upon ancestry and appearance. . . .  Race determines our economic pros-
pects.  The race-conscious market screens and selects us for manual jobs and professional careers, 
red-lines financing for real estate, green-lines our access to insurance, and even raises the price of 
that car we need to buy. Race permeates our politics.  It alters electoral boundaries, shapes the dis-
bursement of local, state, and federal funds, fuels the creation and collapse of political alliances, 
and twists the conduct of law enforcement.  In short, race mediates every aspect of our lives.   
Id. 
Lopez and Loury are not alone on this point.  Scholars across generations and the color line share in 
this belief in the salience of race in American culture.  See W.E.B. DUBOIS, DUSK OF DAWN 139 (1940) 
(“[I]n my life, the chief fact has been race—not so much scientific race, as that deep conviction of myr-
iad men that congenital differences among the main masses of human beings absolutely condition the 
individual destiny of every member of that group.”); Alex Aleinikoff, A Case for Race Consciousness, 
91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 1067 (1991) (“While not every decision we make necessarily has a racial 
97:911  (2003) Thinking Race, Making Nation 
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This is a point that deserves greater prominence than it receives, espe-
cially in light of recent efforts underway in California to eliminate racial 
data collection.  Ward Connerly, a member of the University of California 
Board of Regents and chief proponent of California’s Proposition 209,32 is 
currently pushing a “Racial Privacy Initiative” for the March 2004 Califor-
nia ballot that would essentially ban the state from requiring people to 
check off their race when they apply for a job, register for school, or other-
wise engage in state-regulated activities.33  If this becomes a national 
movement, it would be virtually impossible to gauge whether people of 
color were making progress since public institutions would be banned from 
asking students and potential hires about their racial and ethnic background.  
Although proponents of this initiative claim to want to create a “colorblind” 
society, some argue that the initiative turns a proverbial blind eye to dis-
crimination.34  Regardless of where Loury stands on this single issue, how-
ever, the collection and presentation of evidence of racial disparity is crucial 
to his task of identifying and explaining the root causes of racial inequality.  
While it is true that Loury is principally concerned with providing a theo-
retical explanation of why racial disparity exists, his failure to discuss in 
 
component, when race is present it almost invariably influences our judgments.  We are intensely—even 
if subconsciously—race-conscious.”); Charles Lawrence, The Id, Ego, and Equal Protection:  Reckon-
ing with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) (“Americans share a common histori-
cal and cultural heritage in which racism has played and still plays a dominant role. . . .  To the extent 
that this cultural belief system has influenced all of us, we are all racists.”).    
32  CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31. 
33  See Miguel Bustillo, Ban on Gathering Racial Data on 2004 Ballot, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 2000, at 
B7.  The Racial Privacy Initiative is proposed by the American Civil Rights Coalition, an arm of Ward 
Connerly’s American Civil Rights Institute.  Kevin T. Nguyen is the Executive Director of the American 
Civil Rights Coalition and the official proponent of the Racial Privacy Initiative.  According to the or-
ganization’s website, the Initiative is designed to prevent California’s public agencies from classifying 
“any individual by race, ethnicity, color or national origin in the operation of public education, public contract-
ing or public employment.”  RACIAL PRIVACY INITIATIVE § 32(a), available at http://www.racialprivacy. 
org/language.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2003).  Classification is defined as any “act of separating, sorting or or-
ganizing by race, ethnicity, color or national origin including, but not limited to, inquiring, profiling, or col-
lecting such data on government forms.”  Id. 
34  Patricia J. Williams, Racial Privacy, NATION, June 17, 2002, at 9 (arguing that “the Racial Pri-
vacy Initiative is not about protecting data from being misused; instead it effectively eliminates data col-
lection at all [and] continues a trend begun by Ronald Reagan and pursued by every Republican 
administration since limiting the accountability of public institutions by making vital public information 
unavailable”).  Moreover, as Alex Aleinikoff has argued, the choice between colorblindness and color 
consciousness is, in all likelihood, a false one: 
It is apparently important . . . for whites to assert that they are strongly colorblind, in the sense that 
they do not notice or act on the basis of race.  Once can see this at work in such statements as:  “I 
judge each person as an individual.”  Of course, it cannot be that whites do not notice the race of 
others.  Perhaps what is being said is that the speaker does not begin her evaluation with any pre-
conceived notions.  But this is too difficult to believe, given the deep and implicit ways in which 
our minds are color-coded.  To be truly colorblind in this way . . . requires color consciousness:  
one must notice race in order to tell oneself not to trigger the usual mental processes that take race 
into account. 
Aleinikoff, supra note 31, at 1079. 
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more detail the nature and extent of actual racial disparity is an omission 
that may have the effect of leaving some otherwise convincible readers un-
persuaded by his argument.  
B. The Logic of the Self-Confirming Stereotype 
Loury’s argument in earnest begins with an analysis of the role of ra-
cial stereotypes in generating and sustaining racial inequality.  For Loury, 
the persistence of racial inequality is intimately linked to our collective reli-
ance upon racial stereotypes.  Human beings, according to Loury, are natu-
rally hungry for information that will serve as guideposts when making 
“choices on matters of consequence.”35  We classify this information in a 
variety of ways for our own purposes, and employ what we learn as needed. 
In addition to classifying features of our environment, we are constantly 
engaged in the process of classifying human subjects as well.  “Race,” ac-
cording to Loury, is simply one of many modes “of perceptual categoriza-
tion that people use to navigate their way through a murky, uncertain social 
world.”36  Under this view, racial classifications are neither necessarily 
good nor necessarily bad, but happen, because classifying human subjects is 
a “universal practice, one that lies at the heart of all social cognitive behav-
ior,” and visible, physical markers such as color are available criteria that 
can be used to classify human subjects.37 
Racial classification, in and of itself, does not cause racial inequality.  
Problems arise, however, when racial classification takes the form of racial 
stereotyping—that is, when we take some generalization about a group of 
people and use it as the basis for interaction with a specific member of that 
group.  As Loury correctly notes, however, not all stereotypes are the same.  
Some stereotypes are premised upon myth, speculation, or sheer imagina-
tion—“blacks are lazy,” “Jews are cunning”—while other racial generaliza-
tions seem “reasonable” because they are supported by some experience or 
evidence.38 
 
35  LOURY, supra note 11, at 17.    
36  Id. at 16. 
37  Id. at 18–19. 
38  Loury’s distinction between irrational and rational discrimination is firmly rooted in the eco-
nomic literature on discrimination.  Loury’s account of racial discrimination as the product of imperfect 
information reflects Gary Becker’s basic economic theory of race discrimination.  According to Becker, 
racial discrimination is an irrational, “taste-based” discrimination that occurs because the discriminating 
actor experiences some disutility from associating with the group he dislikes.  GARY S. BECKER, THE 
ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 16–17 (2d ed. 1971).  Applied in the employment context, Becker ar-
gued that racial discrimination is inherently inefficient—that it wastes and underutilizes human re-
sources of African Americans by irrationally reducing their employment opportunities, and that it 
imposes substantial opportunity costs on employers, whose discriminatory practices cause them to pass 
over, to their own competitive disadvantage, valuable chances to hire African Americans whose services 
are, comparatively speaking, underpriced.  See generally BECKER, supra.  Becker’s associational prefer-
ence model of discrimination is considered by some to be “the prevailing economic theory of race dis-
crimination.”  Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict:  The Economics of Group Status 
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Loury is principally concerned with the latter set of “reasonable” 
stereotypes because these sorts of generalizations appear correct insofar as 
they are corroborated by “proof.”  Loury’s claim, however, is that even 
when there is a reason to believe that members of a group are a certain way 
based upon prior social interaction, that reason may not only be incorrect, 
but a product of the social interaction itself.  That is, a stereotype may be 
self-confirming.  Loury offers a few examples of how this might occur.  
Suppose (1) that an employer has a practice of closely observing all new 
hires during a probationary training period, (2) the employer can observe 
the mistakes made by new hires, but not the effort exerted during the train-
ing period, and (3) the employer will have greater difficulty in dismissing 
an employee once the training period has been completed.  In addition, sup-
pose that an employer generally believes that black hires tend to exert less 
effort than white hires, and as a result, allows for fewer mistakes to be 
committed by blacks than by other employees before seeking dismissal of 
that employee during the training period.39  How will the new black hires 
respond to the employer’s behavior? 
Loury tells us that if the black hires perceive that the standard to which 
they are being held is considerably more stringent than the standard im-
posed upon non-black hires, they will likely reduce the amount of effort ex-
pended during the training period because the expected benefit (avoiding 
dismissal) does not exceed the costs (effort expended to avoid mistakes).  
The reduction in effort may lead black hires to make a greater number of 
mistakes, which the observant employer will interpret as confirmation of his 
initial suspicions regarding the lack of effort by black hires.  More impor-
tantly, the employer will likely feel justified in imposing the more stringent 
standard in light of “proof” of racial difference in the effort expended by 
new hires. 
In another example, Loury asks us to suppose that (1) most taxi drivers 
refuse to stop for young black men after a certain hour for fear of being 
robbed, (2) that there are some taxi drivers who will stop for anyone, and 
(3) that there are two types of young black men out there—the law-abiding 
black man who is simply trying to get home and the black man intent on 
 
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1033 (1995).  For a discussion of the 
competing view that race-based employment discrimination may be rational and efficient, see RICHARD 
A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS:  THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 59–78 
(1992) (arguing that race-based employment discrimination is often entirely rational and an efficient 
means of holding down internal frictions that arise from long-term employment contracts, and, where it 
is rational, it should not be forbidden); Richard A. Epstein, Standing Firm, On Forbidden Grounds, 31 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 54–56 (1994) (arguing that Title VII is inefficient because it fails to allow any 
room for rational race-based employment discrimination). 
Loury’s distinction between Becker’s form of racial discrimination and racial discrimination that ap-
pears rational insofar as the discriminating actor uses distinguishing racial markings as an indicia of 
some unfavorable trait based upon past experience is also consistent with the economics literature.  See 
Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 659 (1973). 
39  LOURY, supra note 11, at 29. 
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robbery.  How might the stereotype of the dangerous young black male be 
confirmed in this scenario? 
Loury reasons that, for the law-abiding men, the long wait for a poten-
tial taxi ride will discourage dependence on taxis as a source of transporta-
tion.  These individuals will find some other means of late-night 
transportation.  However, a person’s intent upon robbery will not be simi-
larly discouraged.  As Loury explains, “[e]ven though he knows most cabs 
are unlikely to stop, [the would-be robber] only needs one to do so to get in 
[a] night’s work.”40  Because taxi drivers’ reluctance to stop discourages 
more law-abiding men than robbers from seeking late-night taxi service, 
“the set of young black men actually seen to be hailing taxis after dark may 
come to contain a larger than average fraction of robbers, precisely the cir-
cumstance presumed by the drivers in the first place.”41 
Both the employer and the taxi drivers’ behavior create facts that 
“proved” the validity of the stereotypes they held.  Loury’s point, of course, 
is that there is no intrinsic connection between race and lack of effort or 
race and criminality.  Beliefs and behaviors informed by stereotypes can 
generate outcomes that appear to justify racially disparate treatment and, as 
a consequence, generate and reinforce concrete indicia of racial disparity in 
social and economic life.42 
Loury’s account of the logic of the self-confirming stereotype is simi-
lar to research by Stanford psychologist Claude Steele in the phenomenon 
called “stereotype threat,” in which the deployment of negative stereotypes 
have been shown to affect standardized test performance by students to 
whom they might apply.43  In one experiment, white and black students at 
 
40  Id. at 30.   
41  Id. at 31. 
42  The phenomenon Loury describes is a classic instance of adverse selection, where the process se-
lects against quality in the market.  Adverse selection is typically illustrated using an insurance-related 
hypothetical.  Suppose that an auto insurer must predict the probability of a claim in order to set the 
price of the insurance premium.  Further suppose that drivers know more about the probability of a 
claim than insurers know.  Under this set of conditions, drivers with a high probability of a claim will 
seek insurance, which causes premiums to rise. Some drivers with a low probability of a claim respond 
to the rise in premiums by dropping their insurance, which causes another rise in premiums, and so 
forth.  This process selects against quality in the market, as more bad drivers seek insurance and more 
good drivers drop their policies. 
Here, the taxi driver’s behavior screens out law abiding black patrons, leaving a disproportionate 
number of non-law abiding blacks in the market for taxi services.  For a discussion of the general phe-
nomenon of adverse selection, see George A. Akerlof, The Market for ‘Lemons’:  Quality, Uncertainty 
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).  For a discussion of the general effects of ad-
verse selection on risk pooling, see Mark Pauly & Sean Nicholson, Adverse Consequences of Adverse 
Selection, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 921 (1999) (describing the costs of adverse selection); 
George. L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521 (1987) (argu-
ing that the crisis in product liability insurance in the United States in the 1980s stemmed mainly from 
low risk firms dropping out of the insurance market). 
43  See Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Test Performance of Aca-
demically Successful African Americans, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 401 (Christopher 
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Stanford University were given twenty-seven difficult questions from the 
verbal sections of past Graduate Record Exams.44  The diagnostic group of 
students was told that their abilities were being measured; the control group 
was told that the purpose of the experiment was “to examine the psychol-
ogy of problem solving.”45  As Steele and Aronson report, black students in 
the diagnostic group performed far worse than black students in the control 
group, while white students performed at the same level in both groups.46  
Steele offered the following explanation for diminished performance on ex-
ams that could not be attributed to bias on the part of the test designer nor to 
inferior skills of the test taker: 
African American students know that any faltering could cause them to be 
seen through the lens of a negative racial stereotype.  Those whose self-regard 
is predicated on high achievement—usually the stronger, more confident stu-
dents—may feel this pressure so greatly that it disrupts and undermines their 
test performance.47 
Steele’s analysis, much like Loury’s use of the self-confirming stereotype, 
highlights how stereotypes can be deployed in social interaction to influ-
ence and shape outcomes consistent with the stereotype. 
Loury’s discussion of self-confirming stereotypes, though enlighten-
ing, gives me pause for at least three reasons.  First, let us assume, as most 
economists do, that people act in ways that are perfectly rational.  Can we 
confidently say that man as “homo economicus” would respond in such 
singular fashion?  Take Loury’s employment example.  Loury argues that 
under such circumstances, the rational response by the African-American 
hire would be to reduce his effort and, in all likelihood, induce an early 
dismissal.  Yet it would seem equally rational for that same African-
American hire to continue to put forth the same degree of effort—despite 
being held to a higher standard—if for no other reason than to remain gain-
fully employed and to retain the opportunity to earn a living.  In other 
words, it is not entirely clear that this scenario yields only one “rational” 
outcome. 
Second, does it make sense to conclude that every member of a racial 
group will respond in such a rational and conveniently predictable fashion?  
Again, consider the employment hypothetical—when faced with an unusu-
ally stringent review standard by the employer, would not some blacks 
 
Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998); Claude Steel, A Threat in the Air:  How Stereotypes Shape Intel-
lectual Identity and Performance, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 613, (1997); see also Claude M. Steele, Thin 
Ice:  Stereotype Threat and Black College Students, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug. 1999, at 44. 
44  See Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Vulnerability and African-American Intel-
lectual Performance, in READINGS ABOUT THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 409, 411 (Elliot Aronson ed., 7th ed. 
1995). 
45  Id. 
46  Id. at 414.   
47  See Steele & Aronson, supra note 43, at 402. 
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choose to “rise to the occasion,” so to speak, overperform, and thereby ex-
ceed expectations?  If so, would the number of would-be superacheivers 
vary depending upon the employment context—that is, might we expect 
more superacheivers among the ranks of entry level professionals as com-
pared to unskilled laborers?  Similarly, in the taxi hypothetical, might we 
not expect to find a critical mass of would-be taxi passengers that either call 
a taxi service directly to reserve a taxi when needed, or who are willing to 
wait for some taxi to stop rather than arrange for some alternative?  In short, 
why does Loury presuppose that considerations other than efficiency or ra-
tionality—such as workers’ pride or preferences for taxis over other forms 
of public transportation—that appear less “rational” at first blush and more 
difficult to capture and quantify will have little if any impact upon an 
individual’s responsive behavior? 
The answer, I suspect, is that Loury, as a trained economist, is doing 
what he does best—economic modeling of extremely complex behavior.  
Loury’s modeling seems consistent with the classic economics model, 
which places a premium on rational choice and efficiency insofar as it as-
sumes that people think and act in a perfectly rational manner.48  The prob-
lem, of course, is that people are not so easy modeled.  Recently, behavioral 
economists have criticized this classic economic model and its reliance 
upon this assumption of perfect rationality as an inaccurate description of 
human reality.  The basic theme advanced in this burgeoning area of 
thought is that people are not perfectly rational, and that a host of non-
rational factors and biases often inform human decisionmaking.49  In light 
of credible evidence to suggest that individuals frequently act in ways that 
are incompatible with the assumptions of rational choice theory,50 it is 
likely that Loury’s classic economic modeling presupposes a level of sim-
plicity, rationality and predictability in behavioral responses that does not 
square with the human experience.51 
 
48  See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (5th ed. 1998) (“The task of eco-
nomics . . . is to explore the implications of assuming that man is a rational maximizer of his ends in  
life . . . .”).  For a review of rational choice principles in economics and their extension in political sci-
ence, see DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 1–12 
(1994).  For a general defense of rational choice theory, see Dennis Chong, Rational Choice Theory’s 
Mysterious Rivals, 9 CRITICAL REV. 37 (1995). 
49  Behavioral economic research typically focuses on decision-making heuristics and biases that are 
inconsistent with rational choice economics.  See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment 
Under Uncertainty:  Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1130 (1974).  Scholars have begun to incor-
porate the behavioral economics viewpoint into legal analysis as well.  See, e.g., Russell Korobkin & 
Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement:  An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. 
L. REV. 107 (1994) (reviewing history of behavioral economics as applied to the law).   
50  See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:  Removing the 
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1102–26 (2000) (discussing 
evidence that people frequently act in ways that are incompatible with the assumptions of rational choice 
theory).   
51  Whether personal pride, emotions, concepts of justice, or “other regarding behaviors” can be ef-
97:911  (2003) Thinking Race, Making Nation 
 925
                                                                                                                          
Finally, how much of current racially disparate treatment and ensuing 
disparity is premised upon these self-confirming stereotypes?  While it is pos-
sible that a great deal does take this form, it seems at least as likely that the 
same amount if not more is premised upon “unreasonable” stereotypes or 
brute racism.  The revelation of fairly recent episodes of vulgar discrimina-
tion in the assessment of life insurance premiums,52 the sale of automobiles,53 
employment decisionmaking,54 and criminal victimization55 reminds us that 
brute racism is alive and well.  To his credit, Loury tells us that self-
confirming stereotype-induced behavior is not “the be-all and end-all of race-
based behavior in society.”56  But it must account for a great deal of it—or at 
least the most meaningful form of racialized behavior that leads to racial ine-
quality—as much of Loury’s argument seems to hinge upon this point. 
C. Racial Stigma and the Seductiveness of Race-Thinking 
At the heart of Loury’s analysis is his account of the role of racial 
stigma in perpetuating racial inequality.  After all, stereotypes perpetuate 
racial inequality only to the extent that we feel comfortable and confident 
relying upon them as credible guideposts in social interaction.57  If there 
was some reason to think that the connection between race and a host of 
other beliefs was wholly artificial, then it would stand to reason that the 
natural inclination toward better informed social decisionmaking would 
 
fectively modeled using rational choice theory alone remains a source of continued debate.  Compare 
Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) 
(noting that empirical research by behavioral economists indicates that economic subjects often act in 
ways that do not fall within the neoclassical definition of “rationality”), with Richard A. Posner, Ra-
tional Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1552, 1559 (1998) (arguing 
that many of the insights of behavior economics are “already a part of economic analysis of law, which 
long ago abandoned the model of hyperrational, emotionless, unsocial, supremely egoistic, nonstrategic 
man” and that the behavioralists’ fixation upon other nonrational behaviors robs behavioral economics 
of its predictive power as a theory).  For an overview of the debate and a discussion of the concept of 
“rationality” in neoclassical economics and the law and economics movement, see Jeanne L. Schroeder, 
Rationality in law and Economics Literature, 79 OR. L. REV. 147 (2000). 
52  See Ellen Kelleher, MetLife Settles Class-Action Suit, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2002, at 2 (reporting 
that MetLife had settled a massive class-action lawsuit in which the plaintiffs alleged the New York in-
surer charged black clients more money for certain life insurance policies from 1901 until 1972). 
53  See supra note 5. 
54  See Henry Unger, Coke To Settle Racial Suit with $192.5 Million Deal, ATLANTA J.-CONST., 
Nov. 17, 2000, at A1 (announcing settlement of lawsuit in which plaintiffs claimed that the Coca-Cola 
Company had discriminated against black salaried employees in pay, promotions and performance 
evaluations). 
55  See JOYCE KING, HATE CRIME:  THE STORY OF A DRAGGING IN JASPER, TEXAS (2002) (describ-
ing the racially motivated 1998 mutilation and murder of James Byrd, Jr. by three white men). 
56  LOURY, supra note 11, at 34. 
57  Moreover, that fact that one has come to learn stereotypes does not necessarily mean that one 
must act upon them.  See Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice:  Helping Legal Decisionmakers 
Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733, 749 (1995) (observing that although ethnic attitudes 
and stereotypes are part of a society's social heritage, “people do not always endorse the knowledge 
structures that socialization has established in their memories”). 
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cause some of us to abandon stereotype-informed thinking.  Why, in a 
realm of uncertainty, might a person cling to stereotypes nonetheless?  Why 
not experiment in social interaction? 
The answer, according to Loury, is that one may be willing to revise 
one’s beliefs, but only when observed conditions and behaviors would seem 
to defy rather than affirm the beliefs.  Thus, as Loury points out: 
[I]f a racial disparity does not strike a powerful observer as being disturbing, 
anomalous, contrary to his unexamined and perhaps not even consciously es-
poused presumptions about the nature of the social world, then he may make 
no special effort to uncover a deeper (than race) cause of the disparity.58 
This, of course, raises a deeper question—namely, why would it not occur 
to the discriminator that the disparity is a result of his own action?  The rea-
son, according to Loury, is that at bottom, there is a profound awareness of 
the racial “otherness” of blacks that is deeply ingrained in the American 
cultural consciousness—an “otherness” that brings to mind a host of nega-
tive presumptions, taboos, and suspicions.  This, he explains, is the territory 
“of racial stigma, of dishonorable meanings socially inscribed on arbitrary 
body marks, of ‘spoiled collective identities.’”59  When the subjects are ra-
cially stigmatized, the prospects of undoing racial beliefs that generate ra-
cial disparity are sharply diminished.  A discriminator refuses to learn 
differently because he does not think learning will pay.  Challenging stereo-
types will be perceived to be a waste of time.  And “[u]nless he is willing to 
experiment, to test the limits of his prior generalization as a matter of prin-
ciple, he will retain his false belief.”60  When a group is stigmatized in this 
manner, to the point where social identity ascribed to group members by ex-
ternal observers essentially devalues their humanity, the group suffers from 
what Loury calls a “spoiled collective identity.” 
Loury’s invocation of racial stigma and spoiled identity is consistent 
with the theory of racism advanced by George Fredrickson.  For over three 
decades, Frederickson has advanced the theory that racism originates from a 
mindset fixated upon stigmatized racial difference that is “permanent and 
unbridgeable.”61  As Frederickson observes: 
This sense of difference provides a motive or rationale for using our power ad-
vantage to treat the ethnoracial Other in ways that we regard as cruel or unjust 
if applied to members of our own group.  The possible consequences of this 
nexus of attitude and action range from the unofficial but pervasive social dis-
 
58  LOURY, supra note 11, at 42. 
59  Id. at 59.   
60  Id. at 64 (emphasis removed).  This explanation echoes the sentiment expressed by Alex 
Aleinikoff in his own meditation on the durability of racial stereotypes in American thinking:  “It is of-
ten more likely that our mental schema will influence how we understand new information than it is that 
the new information will alter our mental schema.”  Aleinikoff, supra note 31, at 1067. 
61  FREDERICKSON, supra note 2, at 9 (2002); see also GEORGE FREDERICKSON, THE ARROGANCE 
OF RACE (1988); GEORGE FREDERICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND (1971). 
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crimination at one end of the spectrum to genocide at the other . . . .  In all 
manifestations of racism from the mildest to the most severe, what is being de-
nied is the possibility that the racializers and the racialized can coexist in the 
same society, except perhaps on the basis of domination and subordination.62   
Importantly, this concept of racism is contingent upon the rejection of any 
notion that an individual member of a racially stigmatized group can re-
move racial stigma through alternation or reformation of one’s racial iden-
tity.63  Loury maintains that racial stigma of African Americans—this 
“spoiled collective identity”—is rooted in the institution of slavery.  Here, 
Loury relies heavily upon the insights of Orlando Patterson.  In Slavery and 
Social Death,64 Patterson argues that in addition to providing for property in 
man, slavery allowed for “the permanent, violent domination of natally al-
ienated and generally dishonored persons.”65  Loury, summarizing Patter-
son’s work, observes that “[m]asters derive honor from their virtually 
unlimited power over slaves, who are radically marginalized because their 
very social existence is wholly dependent on relations with their masters.”66 
Both Loury and Patterson are correct to point to racial dishonor as cru-
cial to the perpetuation of slavery and the racial pigmentocracy that fol-
lowed in the form of segregation.  Indeed, this was one of the principle 
insights offered by Alexis de Tocqueville in his meditation on “The Three 
Races in the United States.”67  Writing in 1832, Tocqueville observed: 
The greatest difficulty in antiquity was that of altering the law; among the 
moderns it is of altering the customs . . . .  The tradition of slavery dishonors 
the race, and the peculiarity of the race perpetuates the tradition of slav-
ery. . . .  Thus, the Negro transmits the eternal mark of his ignominy to all his 
descendents; and although the law may abolish slavery, God alone can obliter-
ate the traces of its existence . . . .  You may set the Negro free, but you cannot 
make him otherwise than an alien to the European.68 
For Tocqueville, the omnipresence of slavery and its concomitant rhetoric 
of Negro inferiority were the most powerful obstacles to the achievement of 
racial equality.  As Tocqueville observed: 
There is a natural prejudice that prompts men to despise whoever has been 
their inferior long after he has become their equal; and the real inequality that 
is produced by fortune or by law is always succeeded by an imaginary inequal-
ity that is implanted in the manners of people.69   
 
62  GEORGE M. FREDERICKSON, RACISM:  A SHORT HISTORY 4 (2002). 
63  Id.   
64  PATTERSON, supra note 4. 
65  Id. at 13. 
66  LOURY, supra note 11, at 68. 
67  DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 331–434.  
68  Id. at 358.   
69  Id. at 357. 
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But it bears emphasis that the concept of racial dishonor serves not only to 
denigrate the racial identity of blacks as a social group, but might also be 
understood as possessing a reflexive quality that has the opposite affect on 
the racial identity of whites as a group.  Where slavery dishonors blacks, it 
also plays a crucial role in shaping and maintaining white identity.  As Ed-
gar Gardner Murphy wrote in Problems of the Present South,70 “it is cer-
tainly no tribute to the Caucasian to assume that his own proud and historic 
race, with its centuries of start and the funded culture of all civilization at its 
command, cannot keep ahead of the [N]egro, no matter what the [N]egro 
can know or do.”71  The role of racial stigma in shaping presumptions of 
white capacity—of racial superiority and cultural distinctiveness—is an im-
portant corollary to Loury’s main point on racial stigma.  To hold fast to no-
tions of black American racial inferiority is, to a certain extent, to affirm 
what it means to be white in America.   
To question the legitimacy of black American racial stigma, then, is to 
cast doubt upon a fundamental component of white identity.  Loury points 
out that to properly confront racial stigma, whites first must give “the pre-
sumption of equal humanity” to black Americans.  Yet he quickly concedes 
that this presumption is not freely given in American culture.72  He fails to 
elaborate on why this is so, but the answer may lie in this corollary point:  
to extend a presumption of equal humanity to African Americans requires 
white Americans to give up something of immense value, some constituent 
element of the constructed white American identity.73 
Loury’s emphasis on racial stigma, while answering some questions, 
raises many others.  For instance, is there a reason to think that racial 
stigma is insurmountable in the case of African Americans?  Certainly, 
other groups—Asian immigrants and Jews, for example—were historically 
stigmatized, but have largely overcome these social impediments.  Why 
does similar success for African Americans remain so elusive? 
Moreover, does racial stigma maintain the same form over time?  
Loury’s analysis presupposes that racial dishonor from slavery—what 
Loury describes as “an entrenched if inchoate presumption of inferiority, of 
 
70  EDGAR GARDNER MURPHY, PROBLEMS OF THE PRESENT SOUTH (Negro Univ. Press 1969) 
(1904). 
71  Id. at 81. 
72  LOURY, supra note 11, at 87. 
73  See Crenshaw, supra note 10, at 1373 (observing the ways in which white identity is constructed 
in opposition to black identity); see also Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 
1707, 1720–21 (1993) (“Because whites could not be enslaved or held as slaves, the racial line between 
white and Black was extremely critical . . . .  White identity and whiteness were sources of privilege and 
protection; their absence meant being the object of property.”).  For an interesting discussion of how the 
construction of white identity plays out in the immigrant context, see BRUCE NELSON, DIVIDED WE 
STAND:  AMERICAN WORKERS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EQUALITY 200 (2001) (observing how 
Irish immigrants would seek to establish their white identity by “creating social and psychological dis-
tance between themselves and African Americans and, as a first priority, severing the occupational and 
residential ties that linked the two groups in the popular imagination”). 
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moral inadequacy, of unfitness for intimacy, of intellectual incapacity”74—
has carried forward to the present largely unchanged.  While this may be 
true to some extent, it seems the case that racial stigma might be more pow-
erfully understood as possessing a dynamic character.  The content of racial 
stigma must be filtered through human experience.  For stigma to have any 
longevity, then, each successive generation must find its own reasons to 
hate. 
Nothing has proven more corrosive of modern American race relations 
than the perceived link between blackness and rampant criminality.  As 
Katheryn Russell writes, “[a] person would have to live as a hermit to avoid 
seeing crime portrayed in shades of Black.”75  The connection is more than 
one of media imagery—we also have racial language, such as “black-on-
black crime” and “black criminality.”76  This link between blackness and 
criminality also manifests itself in racially disparate law enforcement pol-
icy.  Such policy, according to Randall Kennedy, creates cycles of resent-
ment: 
Many law-abiding blacks resent the racial discrimination to which they are 
subjected [because they are treated like] criminals with whom they are lumped 
by dint of color.  Many of them voice their resentment by attacking as “racist” 
those who view blackness as a proxy for enhanced criminality [which,] in turn, 
deepens the anger of those who view [such charges] as yet another way of de-
nying that blacks, too, bear some responsibility for the sorry state of American 
race relations.77 
Second, and related, is the perceived link between blackness and moral 
or cultural depravity.  The connection is most pronounced in discussions 
regarding the propriety of assisting the “black underclass.”  As Dorothy 
Roberts observed, 
black responsibility for the effects of racism borrows from the long-standing 
ideology that blames the poor, because of their dependence mentality, deviant 
family structure, and other cultural depravities, for their poverty.  The rhetoric 
describing the undeserving poor, although encoded in race-neutral language, is 
increasingly racialized.  Americans conjure up the image of Willie Horton and 
black “welfare queens” when they discuss the “underclass,” whose intractable 
poverty stems from their own deplorable behavior rather than societal condi-
tions.78 
Perceptions of modern day criminality and cultural depravity would thus 
seem to provide sufficient grist to sustain the racial stigma mill, independ-
 
74  Id. at 70. 
75  KATHERYN RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME 110 (1998). 
76  Id.   
77  RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND LAW, at x–xi (1997). 
78  Dorothy Roberts, The Priority Paradigm:  Private Choices and the Limits of Equality, 57 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 363, 386 (1996) (footnotes omitted). 
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ent of attitudes or beliefs that harken back to slavery days. 
Loury acknowledges as much when he writes “[o]bviously, slavery has 
not been the only historical event relevant to the making of racial 
stigma . . . .  Social perceptions of racial worth have also been shaped by 
more recent events.”79  But how much is attributable to slavery, and how 
much is attributable to “so-called pathological behaviors often associated 
with the so-called black underclass?”80  I suspect that there is not only a 
fundamental lack of consensus as to the root cause or causes of modern 
forms of racial stigma, but that approaches to the elimination of racial 
stigma will vary depending upon its perceived origin.81  
D. Critique of Liberal Individualism 
In the final stage of his argument, Loury argues that public policy ef-
forts ought to be aimed at eliminating the lingering effects of racial stigma 
(we might call this substantive racial justice) rather than focus on proce-
dural mechanisms that attempt to remedy racial transgressions (this might 
be called procedural racial justice).  Loury argues that we should focus on 
the problem of racial stigma rather than prototypical racial discrimination 
because the concept of racial discrimination “cannot reach the problem of 
‘development bias,’ a term Loury employs to describe “the systematic de-
nial of opportunity to acquire productivity.”82  Process-based solutions to 
proscribe discrimination “in contract”—that is, discrimination in formal 
 
79  LOURY, supra note 11, at 73. 
80  Id. at 73. 
81  Scholarly exploration of the ways in which identified pathological customs and habits of blacks 
have served to destabilize and undermine black communities has added an interestingly layer of com-
plexity to our appreciation of the persistence of racial disparities in social and economic life.  For in-
stance, some have argued that exogenous forces, such as racism and economic discrimination, are no 
longer serious obstacles to African American advancement.  See, e.g., JOHN H. MCWHORTER, LOSING 
THE RACE:  SELF-SABOTAGE IN BLACK AMERICA (2000) (arguing that African Americans are not 
achieving as much as they could because of a pervasive cult of “victimology” and “separatism” and a 
pervasive ethic of anti-intellectualism).  Others, however, persuasively assert that the persistence of 
pathological behaviors by members of the so-called black underclass have deep, structural causes that 
make elimination of such behaviors exceedingly complex.  See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. 
DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:  SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF AN UNDERCLASS (1993) (exam-
ining how racial and residential segregation aid in the perpetuation of black poverty, crime, and social 
disorder); WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED:  THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, 
AND PUBLIC POLICY 121 (1987). 
[T]hose who argue that the deteriorating economic plight of the truly disadvantaged minorities can 
be satisfactorily addressed simply by confronting the problems of current racial bias fail to recog-
nize how the fate of these minorities is inextricably connected with the structure and function of 
the modern American economy. . . .  [P]olicies that do not take into account the changing nature of 
the national economy—including its rate of growth and the nature of its variable demand for labor; 
the factors that affect industrial employment, such as profit rates, technology, and unionization; 
and patterns of institutional and individual migration that result from industrial transformation and 
shifts—will not effectively handle the economic dislocation of low-income minorities. 
Id. 
82  LOURY, supra note 11, at 93. 
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transactions—does not reach discrimination “in contact”—that is discrimi-
nation in the informal, private spheres of life. 
For Loury, human social and economic development is closely tied to 
this latter, complex set of private affiliations: 
Each individual is socially situated, and one’s location within the network of 
social affiliations substantially affects one’s access to various resources.  Op-
portunity travels along the synapses of these social networks . . . .  An individ-
ual’s inherited social situation plays a major role in determining his or her 
ultimate economic success.83 
Because racial stigma infects these informal networks, “[s]ome important 
part of racial inequality . . . arises from . . . their ‘social otherness’ [and] in-
hibits the development of their full potential.”84  More importantly, “an in-
dividual’s opportunities to acquire skills depend on present and past skill 
attainments by others in the same racial group.”85 
Loury therefore concludes that present inequality among individuals 
and between groups must embody the social and economic disparities that 
have existed in the past to some degree.86  But as Loury points out, “[i]f the 
past disparities are morally illegitimate, the propriety of the contemporary 
order must also be called into question.”87  For this reason, he calls upon the 
cultural elite to take the history of racial subjugation seriously—to “take re-
sponsibility for such situations as the contemporary plight of the urban 
black poor, and to understand them in a general way as a consequence of an 
ethically indefensible past.”88 
For Loury, this means that we should reject colorblind approaches in 
favor of race-sighted policies.  Colorblindness, which is rooted in liberal in-
dividualism, looks only to procedural fairness in the public sphere and ig-
nores both historical disadvantage and present-day disadvantage 
engendered through discrimination in the informal private sphere.  By con-
trast, race-sighted policies aim squarely at promoting “racial egalitarian-
ism”—the reduction of inequities of wealth and power between racial 
groups.89  The move to race sightedness should be undertaken self-
consciously, according to Loury.  We must overcome indifference to racial 
inequality and treat it as a national problem for which each of us bears some 
responsibility.  This comprehensive moral vision should prompt us to ask, 
“What manner of people are WE who accept such degradation in our 
midst?”90  A meaningful response, says Loury, must entail the embrace of 
 
83  Id. at 102. 
84  Id. 
85  Id. at 103. 
86  Id. 
87  Id. 
88  Id. at 127. 
89  Id. at 112. 
90  Id. at 159.   
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race-sighted policies designed to “eliminate the objective disparity in eco-
nomic and social capacity that . . . continue[s] to characterize the social 
structure of American public life [and] constitute[s] the most morally dis-
turbing remnant of this nation’s tortured racial past.”91  
This is arguably new territory for Loury, a trained economist, who 
spent the last twenty or so years defending majoritarian efforts to curtail 
liberal racial policy aimed at eliminating both the incidents and the linger-
ing effects of racial discrimination.  In his infamous essay Beyond Civil 
Rights, published the New Republic in 1985, Loury offered the following 
criticism of prevailing efforts to empower blacks through civil rights legis-
lation: 
Many, if not most, people now concede that not all problems of blacks are due 
to discrimination, and that they cannot be remedied through civil rights strate-
gies or racial politics.  I would go even further: using civil rights strategies to 
address problems to which they are ill-suited thwarts more direct and effective 
action. Indeed, the broad application of these strategies . . . threatens to make it 
impossible for blacks to achieve full equality in American society.92 
Early on in his career, Loury espoused the view that the greatest threat to 
racial equality was no longer “white racism” per se, but problems inherent 
in black people themselves.  Blacks, according to a younger Loury, were 
their own worst enemy—agents of their own underdevelopment.  His writ-
ings during this period were deeply critical of affirmative action and gov-
ernment aid strategies.  Instead, Loury argued that the solution to racial 
disparity could be found through strategies of colorblindness, self-help and 
entrepreneurialism.93 
The shift in Loury’s analysis is intriguing not only because it stands 
in such strong contradiction to previously held views, but because in 
making the shift to the left, Loury also replicates the weakness inherent 
in many structural equality arguments.  First, Loury unjustly minimizes 
the successes achieved through conventional process-based antidis-
crimination policy.  Although a good deal of discrimination continues to 
take place in the private spheres of life, a great deal of racial progress 
has occurred precisely because overt acts of formal racial discrimination 
in employment, education and politics have been outlawed.94  So formal 
 
91  Id. at 169. 
92  Glenn C. Loury, Beyond Civil Rights, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 7, 1985, at 22. 
93  See GLENN C. LOURY, ONE BY ONE FROM THE INSIDE OUT:  ESSAYS AND REVIEWS ON RACE 
AND RESPONSIBILITY IN AMERICA (1995) (providing examples of Loury’s approach to colorblindness 
and self-help philosophy); see also Glenn C. Loury, Performing Without a Net, in THE AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION DEBATE 49, 59 (George E. Curry ed., 1996) (“I am also convinced that racial preferences in hir-
ing, educational opportunities and contracting do not provide a solution for this problem.”). 
94  See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (1988)) (outlawing discrimination in employment); Civil Rights Act of 
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3614(a) 
(1988)) (outlawing discrimination in housing); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. II, 78 
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civil rights protection not only matters, but would appear to matter a 
great deal.  Indeed, this is precisely the fault line that separates critical 
race theorists from their theoretical cousins in Critical Legal Studies.  
After the passage and implementation of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 
and 1965, scholars in the Critical Legal Studies movement argued that it 
made little sense to rely upon civil rights to achieve racial justice be-
cause civil rights are merely an extension of the legal system that legiti-
mates and perpetuates the very racial inequality that it now purports to 
remedy.95  Race theorists, such as Kimberlé Crenshaw, Harlon Dalton, 
and others,96 however, quickly pointed out that African Americans did 
not possess the luxury of avoidance of legal strategies for racial prog-
ress.  Indeed, as Crenshaw argued,  
the civil rights movement [should be understood] as a radical challenge to the 
dominant order even though co-optation has been and remains an ever-present 
 
Stat. 243 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a–2000a-6 (1988)); Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. 
L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973p (1988)) (outlawing dis-
crimination in voting); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (outlawing discrimination in public 
education); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 
U.S. 294 (1964) (outlawing discrimination in public accommodations).  The literature suggests there 
may be some connection between economic progress of African Americans and civil rights initiatives.  
See FRANCINE D. BLAU ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF WOMEN, MEN, AND WORK 220–21 (3d ed. 1998) 
(discussing studies examining the effectiveness of antidiscrimination law in reducing gender and race-
based pay disparity); Paul Burstein & Mark Evan Edwards, The Impact of Employment Discrimination 
Litigation on Racial Disparity in Earnings:  Evidence and Unresolved Issues, 28 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 79 
(1994) (arguing that litigation victories are linked to long-term increases in African American earnings); 
John J. Donohue III & James Heckman, Continuous Versus Episodic Change:  The Impact of Civil 
Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Black, 29 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1603, 1603–04 (1991) (noting 
that African American economic advancement may be due, in part, to advances in civil rights).  For a 
discussion of the importance of civil rights in the pursuit of racial justice more generally for African 
Americans, see TUSHNET, supra note 7; Crenshaw, supra note 10, at 1366–69, 1384–87.  But see 
WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED:  THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 55–62, 143–44 (1987) (noting that the success of the civil rights movement further ex-
acerbated the difficulties of the African American poor and contributed to their social isolation because 
integration allowed many middle-class blacks to move to the suburbs and drain the reservoir of available 
of role models and resources). 
95  See Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law:  A 
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978).  For examples of works es-
pousing this view more generally, see MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); 
ROBERTO MANGABIERA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 36–40 (1986); THE 
POLITICS OF LAW:  A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys ed., 1982); Symposium, Critical Legal 
Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984); Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 1276 (1984); Peter Gabel, Reification in Legal Reasoning, 3 RES. L. & SOC. 25 (1980); 
Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1984). 
96  See, e.g., Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies:  The Reconstructive Theology of Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985 (1990); Richard Delgado, The Etheral Scholar:  Does 
Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 300 (1987); Mari J. 
Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom:  Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
323 (1987); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes:  Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987). 
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threat to the movement.  [A] realistic examination of the limited alternatives 
available to Blacks [at that time] makes it clear that legal reform was a viable 
pragmatic strategy for Blacks confronted with the threat of unbridled racism 
on one hand and co-optation on the other.97   
Or, as Dalton put it, “the quite distinct social circumstance of white males 
has led to a ‘rights critique’ that is oblivious to, and potentially disruptive 
of, the interests of people of color.”98  Each of these writers understood the 
limits of liberal individualism to remedy structural racial disparities in 
wealth and politics, but nevertheless appreciated the role of law in securing 
meaningful and important advancements, such as the elimination of formal 
inequality.99 
Second, although substantive equality is desirable, it is far from clear 
how this should be attained.  Loury points out that his argument for racial 
egalitarianism should not be construed as an argument in favor of repara-
tions.100  Race-sighted policies should be adopted “not so much to ‘compen-
sate’ for an ethically troubled past as to adopt the ‘right interpretation’ of 
it.”101  But what form should policies based upon the “right interpretation” 
take?  Here, Loury is conspicuously silent.  This silence is, in many ways, 
unsurprising, as silence with respect to program and implementation is a 
well-known characteristic of leftist structural social criticism.102   
Finally, if Loury is concerned with the elimination of racial dishonor, it 
remains somewhat unclear how the bestowal of substantive equality will 
accomplish this end.  As both Tocqueville and Patterson observed, the be-
stowal of freedom and civil rights do little to restore honor.  Bestowals of 
wealth, education, and political power may make living in a state of dis-
honor more bearable to say the least, but none of these remedies strike one 
as honor restorative.  If the bestowal of honor is contingent upon extending 
a presumption of humanity to African Americans, it is unclear how struc-
tural equality will engender the shift in the minds and hearts of whites 
needed to accomplish this deeply personal task. 
 
97  Crenshaw, supra note 10, at 1335. 
98  Harlon Dalton, The Clouded Prism, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435,440 (1987). 
99  See Crenshaw, supra note 10, at 1383–84. 
100  LOURY, supra note 11, at 127. 
101  Id. 
102  See, e.g., Phillip E. Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want To Be Radical?, 36 STAN. L. REV. 247, 
259–69, 281–89 (1984) (arguing that critical legal studies scholars refuse to address practical issues and 
have no positive political programs); Louis B. Schwartz, With Gun and Camera Through Darkest CLS-
Land, 36 STAN. L. REV. 413, 448–52 (1984) (arguing that critical legal studies writings offer grotesque 
and irresponsible proposals, not viable alternatives).  For examples of critical legal studies-inspired posi-
tive programs, see Gerald Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980); Karl 
Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 
1937–1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978); William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 
STAN. L. REV. 469 (1984). 
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III. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Professor Loury’s Anatomy of Racial Inequality is a powerfully argued 
meditation on the structure of racial inequality in America.  In his conclud-
ing chapter, Loury identifies essentially “two big ideas” emerging from the 
text:  (1) that the prevailing, process-based approach to remedying racial 
inequality that is grounded in liberal individualism is inadequate and (2) 
that racial stigma—as opposed to racial discrimination—is the problem that 
must be confronted in order to fully address the crisis of social exclusion 
and economic disadvantage among African Americans.103  
There are, however, a number of other critical insights that can be 
drawn from Loury’s work.  As an initial matter, Loury’s position acknowl-
edges and affirms the prevailing view among the critical left that a great 
deal of racial interaction that operates to the detriment of blacks is “auto-
matic”—that is, such behaviors are, in many ways, historically conditioned 
and thus go unquestioned by the actor and by those around him.104  He gives 
credence to the often-contested proposition that racial stereotypes are 
deeply rooted in the American cultural consciousness.  More importantly, 
he highlights the seductiveness of racially destructive thinking.  It is easy to 
forget that we are a nation forged in the crucible of racial inequality.  Loury 
reminds us that our unsettling racial past is vitally relevant to shaping our 
current racial dispositions, and in the process, offers a striking refutation of 
the conservative view that America’s racial history is somehow irrelevant 
and that “one gets beyond racism by getting beyond it now.”105  To take se-
riously the problem of racial inequality, we must first confront and come to 
terms with this ugly feature of our national character and shared racial his-
tory. 
A second crucial implication of the text is related to the first—that the 
behaviors that generate and sustain racial inequality, though historically 
conditioned, are not unconscious or unthinking.  To the contrary, such be-
haviors are very much intentional conduct insofar as they are representative 
of a wholesale acceptance of stereotypes and of conscious indifference to 
the structural disparity that ensues.  In this sense, Loury does not absolve 
 
103  LOURY, supra note 11, at 167. 
104  For a discussion of racism as automatic or unconscious behavior, see Barbara J. Flagg, “Was 
Blind, But Now I See”:  White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 
MICH. L. REV. 953 (1993); Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559 (1989); Sheri 
Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016 (1988); Charles 
R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:  Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. 
L. REV. 317 (1987).  For a discussion of unconscious racism applied in the environmental law context, 
see Edward P. Boyle, It’s Not Easy Bein’ Green:  The Psychology of Racism, Environmental Discrimi-
nation, and the Argument for Modernizing Equal Protection Analysis, 46 VAND. L. REV. 937 (1993) 
(arguing that equal protection analysis of environmental racism should not depend on a showing of dis-
criminatory intent because much racism is unconscious and reflexive). 
105  William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage:  Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 775, 809 (1979). 
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bad actors of responsibility.  This account of racial inequality is not so 
much about the experiences of blacks who suffer disparity as it is an ac-
count of the effect of racist inflection upon whites, and what is required to 
overcome this effect. 
But while Loury’s focus is properly positioned upon whites, he makes 
clear that the problem of racial inequality ought not be born by any single 
group.  Loury, then, reflects the prevailing moralistic view of the civil rights 
era that racial discrimination and inequality should be viewed as national 
crisis.  In this way, Loury invokes a collective moral aesthetic that has been 
sorely lacking in recent meditations on the race question.  Race has always 
been a constituent component in the construction of American nationhood 
and empire.  We must ask ourselves, “What manner of people are we 
TODAY” to allow racial inequality to persist?  This proposition makes an 
important challenge to the historic view that racial equality is a functional 
impossibility.  It was once widely believed that “[n]o two free races, re-
maining distinctly apart, can advance side by side, without a struggle for 
supremacy.”106  Consider the 1884 comments of Senator John T. Morgan of 
Alabama: 
The greater their personal successes may be, the more they will feel the pres-
sure of caste, and their advancement in enterprises which may bring them per-
sonal honor and wealth will be checked by the jealousy of caste, so that race 
prejudice will forever remain as an incubus on all their individual or aggre-
gated efforts.107 
Loury’s book offers a crucial counterpoint to this anachronistic view on 
race and the prospects of eliminating racial prejudice. 
At the same time, however, Loury’s book proves deeply unsettling 
from a legal perspective insofar as he seems to expose the limits of what 
law can do for the cause of racial justice.  To paraphrase a point made by 
Professor Karl Llewellyn during the civil rights era, we cannot expect to 
legislate a racial “kiss and make up.”108  Yet Loury’s analysis would seem 
to require something like this.  If the problem is ultimately one of extension 
of the presumption of humanity and restoration of honor, what more can 
law do?  The history of the civil rights struggle is, in a very real sense, the 
 
106  E.W. Gilliam, The African in the United States, POPULAR SCI. MONTHLY, Feb. 1883, at 440. 
107  John T. Morgan, The Future of the Negro, N. AM. REV., July 1884, at 83–84. 
108  See Karl Llewellyn, What Law Cannot Do For Inter-Racial Peace, 3 VILL. L. REV. 30 (1957).  
Llewellyn used this phrase in responding to anti-civil rights advocates that “you cannot ‘legislate’ a 
change of heart or ‘legislate’ friendship or even tolerance or any other thing of mind or spirit or atti-
tude.”  Id. at 32.  Llewellyn conceded this point: 
One can accept the slogan so far as concerns any direct command by way of the law-government 
of a many-wayed, many-grouped, society in rapid movement.  “Kiss and make-up,” even inside 
the family, is a command which presupposes a pre-existing, a going, a lasting regime that offers a 
basis for resumed relations, for revived and remembered affections and patterns of team-work. 
Id.  However, Llewellyn was quick to point out that law can do “queer, slow things” to change people’s 
racial attitudes.  Id. 
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history of struggle to attain acknowledgment of African-American human-
ity, yet Loury suggests that this presumption of humanity is not only rarely 
given, but has yet to occur with respect to African Americans despite these 
efforts.  Affirmative action and similar “tax and transfer” strategies may re-
solve certain aspects of structural inequality, but it is not entirely clear that 
this will also eliminate racial stigma of the sort identified by Loury.  There 
is little guidance to be drawn from Loury’s meditation on the shape of ideal 
structural reform.  Symbolic efforts, such as hate crime legislation,109 ex-
press the view that all are entitled to a presumption of humanity.110  Perhaps 
this is the path to reform that Loury has in mind. 
While Loury’s argument employs the rhetoric of optimism, its logic 
indulges the nihilistic impulse to slip into despair.  The conundrum of racial 
stigma brings to mind the blunt observations of Charles Cooley that “[t]wo 
races of different temperament and capacity, distinct to the eye and living 
side by side in the same community, tend strongly to become castes, no 
matter how equal the social system may be”111 or the painful observations 
of James Baldwin that “[i]t is exceedingly difficult for most of us to discard 
the assumptions of the society in which we were born, in which we live, to 
which we owe our identities; . . . virtually impossible, if not completely im-
possible, to envision the future, except in those terms which we think we al-
ready know.”112  Loury asks us to contest this proposition with all our moral 
 
109  For a comprehensive discussion of hate crime legislation, see FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, 
PUNISHING HATE:  BIAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN LAW (1999).  For a critical perspective on hate 
crime legislation, see JAMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER, HATE CRIMES:  CRIMINAL LAW & 
IDENTITY POLITICS (1998). 
110  See LAWRENCE, supra note 109, at 103.  As Lawrence explains: 
It is not necessary to prohibit either all fighting words or none . . . .  [A] state may properly make 
the judgment that, within the universe of assaults, some are worse than others.  For instance, an as-
sault with a deadly weapon is, in most states, some form of aggravated assault.  The crime is more 
serious than unarmed assault because the defendant has exposed society to greater risk—even if 
the weapon is not actually used—and has presumably caused greater fear in the victim . . . .  Simi-
larly, a state may determine that assaults [or threats to assault] based on race are worse than com-
parable assaults [or threats], because these racially motivated assaults cause greater societal harm 
and injury to the individual and community victims. 
Id.  There is a vast literature on the expressive function of the law. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & 
Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law:  A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 
(2000); Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens?  An Economic Analysis of Internalized 
Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577 (2000); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 
86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 
(1998); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 471–73 
(1997); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022 (1996); 
Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 597 (1996); Lawrence 
Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Richard H. Pildes, Why 
Rights Are Not Trumps:  Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 725 (1998). 
111  CHARLES COOLEY, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION:  A STUDY OF THE LARGER MIND 215 (1909). 
112  JAMES BALDWIN, Every Goodbye Ain’t Gone, in THE PRICE OF THE TICKET:  COLLECTED 
NONFICTION 643 (1985) (emphasis added). 
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might.  Yet the persistence of racial disparities serves as a chronic source of 
frustration for racial progressives. 
In my own view, there is no elegant solution to the race problem in 
America.  Contemporary notions of race and racial identity carry forward 
the heavy baggage of centuries of devastating racial oppression.  This dev-
astation was premised upon an enduring belief in the salience of the racial 
divide.  But race has not always had catastrophic meaning in the lives of 
non-whites.  Voluntary segregation in residential patterns, church affilia-
tion, and club membership hint at an enduring feature of American life—
that persons of all races frequently find comfort and solace in racially seg-
regated private space.  Race matters today and will matter in the foreseeable 
future precisely because race mattered so much in the past and so much of 
ourselves continues to ride on racial ancestry.  Our race consciousness is as 
much a trap of circumstance as it is a web of safety. 
For this reason, I am inclined to reject the elegant formulation of the 
colorblind ideal and its deep skepticism regarding the deployment of racial 
classifications.  The more compelling approach to racial justice is one that 
is sufficiently nuanced to attack vigorously the more pernicious applications 
of race that perpetuate racial inequality without sacrificing the virtues of ra-
cial identity and the sanctuary that group affiliation provides.  I have always 
believed that the ultimate basis by which the achievements of American 
democracy should be judged is its ability to confront and respond meaning-
fully to the absurdity of race and racial injustice.  To understand today’s ra-
cial disparities, one must first come to terms with the horrific absurdity of 
America’s racial past and its intended consequence—the strategic underde-
velopment of certain racial communities.   
An elegant legal response to remedy the effects of generations of brute 
racism is arguably desirable, but by no means necessary.  Professor Stanely 
Fish’s response to the claim that affirmative action constitutes “reverse ra-
cism” is particularly illuminating on this point: 
Reverse Racism is a cogent description of affirmative action only if one con-
siders the cancer of racism to be morally and medically indistinguishable from 
the therapy we apply to it.  A cancer is an invasion of the body’s equilibrium, 
and so is chemotherapy; but we do not decline to fight the disease because the 
medicine we employ is also disruptive of normal functioning.  Strong illness, 
strong remedy:  the formula is as appropriate to the health of the body politic 
as it is to that of the body proper.”113   
Perhaps it is best to turn our attention away from the question of how to 
eliminate racial stigma in the minds and hearts of Americans, and toward 
the more immediate, constructive (and arguably radical) enterprise of how 
to deepen and evolve our legal theory so that our institutions can begin to 
 
113  Stanley Fish, Reverse Racism or How the Pot Got To Call the Kettle Black, ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY, Nov. 1993, at 128, 130. 
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address the current state of material and social inequity correlated to race in 
an unapologetically race-conscious manner. 
Since the beginning of the nation, white Americans have suffered from 
a deep inner uncertainty as to who they really are.  One of the ways that has 
been used to simplify the answer has been to seize upon the presence of 
black Americans and use them as a marker, a symbol of limits, a metaphor 
for the “outsider.”  The Anatomy of Racial Inequality offers a provocative 
look at the manner in which race and the attribution of “outsider status” 
contributes to the social and economic isolation of African Americans.  
Loury reminds us that this “outsider status”—past and present—has real 
consequences in terms of the underdevelopment of African Americans in 
social, political, and economic life.  Loury’s moving text is a clarion call to 
each of us to shake our indifference and respond meaningfully to this crisis.  
In this sense, Loury is not unlike Gunnar Myrdal, who argued that justice 
and equality for African Americans was not simply a moral duty, but part of 
living up to the “American Creed.”114  And like Myrdal, Loury’s words in-
spire us to challenge prevailing attitudes regarding racial difference, and 
boldly embrace a more promising, egalitarian vision as we contemplate the 






















114  See GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA:  THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN 
DEMOCRACY 3–26 (1944) (discussing features of the “American Creed” and its relationship to the status 
of African Americans in public life). 
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